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ABSTRACT
It’s widely agreed that animal pain matters morally—that we
shouldn’t, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we
should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals,
and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same
moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them
if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing
other kinds of pain, for instance from predation? Using an example
that includes both wild and domesticated animals, I outline two contrasting ways of thinking about our moral responsibilities with respect to assisting animals that are apparently in need. One approach
is based entirely around animals’ capacities; the other takes context
and historical relations into account as well. While not attempting to
adjudicate between these views, I’ll point out the advantages and difficulties of both.
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1.Introduction
I’ll begin by constructing an imaginary situation, but one
that I hope is not too far-fetched. Suppose it’s a hard winter, and
an intrepid hiker is out for a long walk. The ground is icy, and
packed with snow, and there’s a strong cold wind. Fenced into a
nearby field, the hiker sees two short-haired horses. The horses
have no shelter, their water trough is frozen, and they haven’t
any food—conditions that are known to create poor horse welfare (University of Maine, 2003). In a corner of the same field,
deep in the snow, there’s a couple of wild deer—a doe and a
fawn. The deer also lack shelter and water, and like the horses,
have nothing to eat. As the hiker watches, a young coyote runs
into the field and tries to bring down the fawn. Eventually, after
various attempts to escape, the coyote tears down the fawn and
there’s a bloody struggle in the snow.
For that hiker passing by, this chilly winter scene might
raise ethical questions. Should she help the cold and hungry
horses, or at least find someone else who can assist them? But
if so, does that mean, to be consistent, she should also help
the cold and hungry deer? Should she intervene to prevent the
coyote tearing down the fawn—assuming she could, without
endangering herself? Or might such an intervention actually be
wrong? Most generally: What kinds of moral responsibilities
do we have to wild animals, such as the deer, and are these different from our responsibilities towards domestic animals, such
as the horses?
A number of different responses to these ethical questions
are possible. I’ll focus on just two of them here. One possible
response is that deer are just as morally significant as horses,
and that whatever we owe to the horses, we also owe to the
deer. So, if we should assist the horses, we should also assist
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the deer. This may not mean that we treat them in exactly the
same way, but in principle what we owe to them is the same.
A second kind of response distinguishes between what we owe
to wild animals, such as the deer, and to domesticated animals,
such as the horses. On this view, while we should assist domesticated animals when threatened by hunger, predators or
disease, other things being equal, we have either no moral responsibility, or much less moral responsibility, to assist wild
animals in similar situations.
I’ll be exploring these two different responses to assisting
animals in this paper. Both of them draw on important ethical
frameworks, frameworks that currently play a role in governing
assistance to needy fellow humans. Relatively little, though,
has been written about assisting animals; understandably, the
focus of work in animal ethics has primarily been on harms to
animals, rather than on assisting them. However, as the field of
animal ethics grows, concerns about how and when we should
help animals are likely to become increasingly important (and
probably, contentious).
I’ll structure the paper as follows: First, I’ll begin with some
points of definition and clarification. Then I’ll outline how
one theoretical approach to animal ethics—an approach that
I’ll call “capacity-oriented”—would respond to this case, and,
more generally to questions about assisting wild animals. I’ll
suggest that, although appealing in some ways, this approach
may embroil us in broader, more troubling commitments in the
wild. I’ll then outline a contrasting, theoretical approach, which
I’ll call “contextual”, and show how it supports an alternative
position, where we have different moral responsibilities to animals in different contexts and relations to us. But this view
also generates significant difficulties, and may end up being not
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much less demanding than the first. Yet, as I’ll suggest in the
conclusion, these views—though over-simplified as presented
here—may well be preferable to the alternatives. So some development and reworking of these positions may be the best
way forward in thinking about assisting animals.

2. Definitions and Clarifications: the law, moral
status and wildness
(a) The law: My focus here is on animal ethics, rather than
the law. That’s not to say that the law isn’t very significant here.
For instance, in Texas, the treatment of the horses I’ve described
would likely constitute a crime of neglect; the owner has “unreasonably failed to provide necessary food, water or care for a
livestock animal in the person’s custody” (TexCode §9 42.09).
That it’s illegal to neglect one’s own horses may provide an
additional motivation to assist the horses in this case, but my
focus here is on ethical responsibilities that hold independently
of whether they are legally recognized. I’m not suggesting, either, that ethical responsibilities should be legally recognized;
an ethical argument that suffering wild animals should be assisted should not be taken to imply that such assistance should
be a legal requirement. Indeed “duty to rescue” laws are controversial even in the human case, and are often not formalized.
(b) Animals and moral status: By “animals”, I’ll here refer
to animals that are widely agreed to have experiential or subjective welfare (Keeling et. al. 2011); those whose lives can
go better or worse for them “from the inside”; in particular,
animals that are sentient, i.e. can feel pain, and can suffer. I will
take suffering to include a “wide range of negative emotional
states” (Dawkins 1980, 25). I’ll assume that all mammals and
birds fall into this category, at least. I’ll further assume that if
a being has welfare in this way, and can feel pain, we should
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think of it as having “moral status”; it’s the kind of being that
should factor into our decision-making, because the states it is
in matter to it. That pain in itself matters morally is, admittedly, denied on some philosophical views (some forms of moral
contractarianism, for instance). However, the view that pain is
sufficient for moral status is very widely accepted, and for reasons of space, I won’t defend it further here. (For a much more
detailed discussion and defense, see Palmer (2010, ch.1)) In
saying this, I’m not intending to make any claims about how
much these beings matter, in particular their moral significance
in relation to humans; nor am I denying that there could be
other, additional grounds for moral status. All I want to claim
here is just that they count for something. I should also note that
I’ll only focus on what might be owed to wild animals as individuals here, rather than as species members or as contributors
to ecosystems; these concerns raises other questions that I don’t
have space to consider.
(c) Wild animals: The term “wild animals” can be used in
many different ways. “Wild animals” could mean “animals that
are not tame” that is, it could be a behavioral term; it could
mean “animals living in relatively uncultivated places”—that
is, a locational term; or it could mean “non-domesticated animals”, where domestication means something like belonging
to a species or subspecies where breeding is selectively and
intentionally controlled over generations (Palmer 2011). These
definitions are all open to challenge; and some animals may be
wild in all these ways. For the purposes of this paper, I’ll use
“wild” in the third sense, to mean undomesticated animals. The
terms “wild” and “domesticated” though, are not intended to be
exclusive, polar opposites. There are many animals that don’t
fall straightforwardly into either category; for instance those
whose genetic makeup is unintentionally but systematically in-
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fluenced by human activities such as hunting, and others whose
breeding was once, but is no longer, selectively controlled by
humans.
Having clarified these points, I’ll return to the main question:

3. What (if anything) do we owe wild animals?
One basic point has already emerged: there would be something morally wrong about deliberately and gratuitously harming wild sentient animals for no meaningful reason. So, if I
were to slowly torture and skin wild animals, causing them
significant pain, for a trivial reason such as that I was bored,
this would be morally wrong. Claiming that sentient animals
directly count for something, I think, commits us to this conclusion. But this isn’t very controversial. And it doesn’t, of course,
mean that all harms to, or killings of, wild animals are wrong.
On some views, if one killed a sentient animal painlessly, even
for trivial reasons, such a killing would be morally permissible.
And there could be very substantial reasons for killing or harming wild animals—where there are serious conflicts of interests
between humans and wild animals (for instance, over the transmission of a zoonotic disease); or where there are very significant human benefits to be gained. In some circumstances,
almost all moral views, including both the views I’ll be discussing, could ethically justify either inflicting pain on wild animals
or killing them.
Although there are important issues here, there’s already
an extensive literature about harming wild animals (Hettinger
1994, Moriarty and Woods 1997). As I’ve already noted, much
less has been said about cases such as the one with which I began. In these cases, the direct cause of animal suffering is non-
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human—such as the weather, disease, lack of food, and predation. Does what we owe to wild animals include assisting them,
as well as refraining from some kinds of unnecessary harm? Do
we have any moral responsibility to feed, shelter or protect wild
animals, and is this different from any responsibilities we have
to domestic animals? It’s in this context that I’ll consider the
two differing views I’ve already outlined: a capacity-oriented
view, and a contextual view.

4. Capacity-oriented Consequentialist view
A number of different kinds of capacity-oriented views exist; in fact most animal ethicists to date have been capacityoriented. Most prominently, animal rights views, such as those
advocated by Tom Regan (1984) or Gary Francione (2000), fall
into this category. However, I’ll focus on a rather different kind
of capacity-oriented view here: a consequentialist, rather than
a rights one.
A capacity-oriented consequentialist view has two central—
and distinct—features. The first is capacity-orientation. What
matters about animals, from this perspective, is the particular
morally-relevant capacities they possess and express, and only
those capacities. Although a variety of animal capacities might
be seen as valuable in this sense, including the capacity to have
preferences or desires, I’ll work with the capacities most commonly discussed: the capacities to undergo pain and suffering,
and to feel pleasure. The second feature here is consequentialism. Consequentialist ethical theories are usually characterized
as maintaining that only the consequences matter in terms of
evaluating whether some action (or policy, or character trait
etc) is morally good or bad. Standardly, “an action is morally
right if and only if there is no other action, among those available to the agent, that has better consequences” (Shaw, 2007).
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The goal, then, is to bring about the best expected consequences in terms of what’s good and what’s bad (though there are different ideas of what is good and bad), normally by maximizing
what’s good, net of what’s bad.
If we combine these features we create an approach where,
roughly, we should aim to maximize the total amount of pleasure, net of pain and suffering, in the world. (Standard forms
of philosophical utilitarianism look like this). Although this is
the view I’ll be discussing here, I should note that these two
features can come apart. Animal rights views are capacity oriented without being consequentialist. And there are forms of
consequentialism in which values not based on capacities are
morally important. But still, the combination of capacity-orientation and consequentialism I’ve outlined is very common,
especially in animal ethics, and so that’s what I’ll focus on here.
Let’s return to my original example, and consider it through
the lens of this kind of capacity-oriented consequentialism. At
first sight, on this view, it would appear as though our passing
hiker should assist both the horses and the deer. Both are suffering in ways that could be relieved; and the coyote is likely to
cause the fawn acute pain. Since the hiker could act to reduce
pain and suffering, it looks as though the best expected consequences would be brought about by doing so.
But it might be objected that this kind of intervention would
not, on closer consideration, bring about the best consequences.
Tending to domesticated animals—the horses—appears unproblematic. But suppose we fed all the starving deer in the
world, and prevented all the painful coyote attacks? Wouldn’t
this bring us to the situation Aldo Leopold (1949) describes
in Thinking Like a Mountain: with “the starved bones of the
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hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own too-much”? Intervention
could cause an explosive rise in deer populations, a corresponding spike in human feeding commitments, hungry and suffering
predators, and so on—with a significant risk of causing more
suffering, rather than less.
There’s something in this concern, but I’m not sure how far
it will withstand scrutiny. To consider it more closely requires
a more careful account of different forms of consequentialism.
I’ll consider two possibilities here.
One relevant kind of consequentialism here is act consequentialism. On this view, an act is morally right if and only
if the total amount of good—in this case pleasure—minus the
total amount of pain, is greater than the net amount for any
incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). So, were we to encounter this situation,
we should do whatever will bring about the greatest amount
of good overall on this occasion, rather than being concerned
about what would result if the same decision were taken on
every similar occasion. This does not mean ignoring the expected long-term consequences of what we do on this occasion.
It means that what we decide in this case doesn’t necessarily
commit us to doing the same thing in other, apparently similar
situations; the acts relevant to each different situation should
be judged independently. And taking this particular situation
alone, assisting seems to be best. Feeding the deer appears to
have better consequences than leaving them hungry. In the longer term, they may get hungry again; but we can reasonably
expect that nourishing food now will reduce their total winter
suffering. It’s unlikely that the survival of these two particular deer alone will make a big difference in over-grazing (and
therefore, animal suffering more broadly) in future years. We
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can also expect best consequences from protecting the fawn.
The coyote may be hungry now, but its hunger is unlikely to be
as bad as the fawn’s pain (not to mention the loss of all the future pleasurable experience that this fawn’s life might contain,
if it continued to live). And while the coyote will certainly try
to find something else to eat, it may scavenge, eat berries, or
trash, that would cause less pain than killing the fawn. So in
terms of expected consequences from this single situation, it
seems likely that the passing hiker should assist, because we
owe wild animals what we owe generally: to maximize pleasure
net of pain, and we can reasonably expect assisting to achieve
this in this particular case.
However, some consequentialists argue that focusing on individual acts does not necessarily bring about best consequences. Instead, they argue, we should adopt what Driver (2012,
86) calls the “indirection strategy”: where “the right action
is the action performed in accordance with (or as a result of)
something else that maximizes the good, such as a set of rules
or a type of motivation”. The most widely accepted form of
indirect consequentialism is rule conequentialism, and, for that
reason, I’ll focus on rule consequentialism here. A rule consequentialist argues that we should follow rules that “if communally accepted would, as far as we can tell, bring about the best
consequences” (Hooker 2000, 1). This means that rather than
thinking about all the consequences in this specific case, we
should instead think about what communally accepted rule, if
followed more generally in cases of this kind, we would expect
to bring about best consequences.
Identifying such a rule isn’t easy. A rule such as “We should
always feed hungry wild animals” or “We should always assist animals threatened with predation” is very unlikely to bring
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about best consequences. But rules that affirm the contrary also
seem unlikely to bring about best consequences. For instance
“Never feed hungry wild animals” would appear to prohibit
practices that seem harmless or that may promote good, such
as feeding wild birds in the garden. This suggests that any rule
would require very careful specification, and each rule would
only apply to some subset of wild animal cases. This could
become complex and unwieldy (which most rule consequentialists find problematic, since for communal acceptance, rules
need to be fairly simple) and if specified far enough, would end
up turning into act consequentialism.
Rule formation is itself tricky. But once we’ve begun thinking about general rules of this kind, broader questions are
raised. After all, both rule and act consequentialism here are
roughly committed to maximize the total amount of expected
pleasure, net of pain, in the world. And this doesn’t seem limited to assistance. It appears to extend to managing the natural
world more broadly. After all, the natural world is full of pain
and suffering. If humans should be trying to minimize pain and
suffering in the world, then this does not mean not just causing, or relieving, existing suffering; presumably, it also entails
trying to change the world such that less suffering arises in the
first place. As McMahan (2010) recently suggested: “Suppose
that we could arrange the gradual extinction of carnivorous
species, replacing them with new herbivorous ones. Or suppose
that we could intervene genetically, so that currently carnivorous species would gradually evolve into herbivorous ones,…
If we could bring about the end of predation by one or the other
of these means at little cost to ourselves, ought we to do it?”
His answer to this question is, essentially that we should. It may
not be possible just now, because we don’t know enough about
the potential effects of doing this on whole ecosystems, so we
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might end up causing more suffering than we prevent. But the
principle is clear: If we could do it, and it would not cause more
suffering than not doing it, we should. From this perspective,
what we owe all animals, wild or not, is to try to make their
lives better, in whatever ways we can, including preventing the
existence of animals that, overall, will make the lives of more
animals worse.
This conclusion follows from the combination of the two
features I identified earlier: capacity orientation and consequentialism. In terms of capacity-orientation: the focus only
on animals’ capacities, such as the capacities to feel pain and
pleasure, makes the distinction signaled in the title of this paper—between “wild” and “domesticated”, morally irrelevant.
Wildness is not a capacity; it’s more like the absence of a certain relation. What matters here is whether and how much an
animal suffers, not whether it’s wild or otherwise. Assuming
that there are no significant physiological differences that (for
instance) cause horses to suffer more from hunger than deer
(or vice versa), there are no relevant moral differences between
them either. When combined with consequentialism—the aim
at best expected outcomes—this view means that all pain and
pleasure falls within the scope of moral concern. On a consequentialist view of this kind, suffering is suffering, wherever
it’s found; and if we can relieve it, or prevent it arising, without
creating equivalent suffering or diminution of pleasure elsewhere, we should. We owe to wild sentient animals exactly
what we owe to any sentient animal: to promote their pleasure,
and to prevent or relieve their pain and suffering, where we
can do so without diminishing pleasure and increasing pain
in others. Of course, there may be some different long-term
consequences down the line from assisting horses and assisting deer—for instance, feeding deer may negatively impact the
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genotype of future deer. But the suffering of wild deer, in itself,
is just as demanding of our moral attention as the suffering of
domestic horses.
Although not all kinds of consequentialism turn out exactly like this (some philosophers have created less demanding
forms—perhaps Scheffler’s (1994) hybrid consequentialism,
satisficing consequentialism, or Varner’s (2012) two-level consequentialism), something like this conclusion flows from most
leading consequentialist views in animal ethics. However, the
alternative contextual, non-consequentialist approach I’ll consider now comes to a contrasting view—that we have different
obligations towards animals with whom we have different relations, even if the animals are very similar in terms of morallyrelevant capacities (such as the capacity to feel pleasure and
pain).

5. Contextual, Non-Consequentialist View
The kind of contextual position I’ll outline here differs with
respect to both the two key features of the previous view. First,
although animals’ capacities—such as the capacity to suffer—
are important, they aren’t all that matters morally. Certain relations between humans and animals matter too. In particular, on
this view, “backward looking” considerations are important—
that is, how animals got into the situations they are in. It’s often
maintained that concerns of this kind are morally important in
the human case. For instance, choosing to have a child, it’s frequently argued, creates special responsibilities to that child that
one doesn’t have to any other child. (For instance, see O’Neill
1979, 26.) On a contextual view, arguments with a similar form
also apply to domesticating animals.
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Second, the kind of contextual view I’ll discuss is not consequentialist (though consequentialist forms of contextual views
might be possible). What’s central are certain constraints, in
particular not causing harms to others (taking harms in something like Feinberg’s (1992) sense to mean the wrongful setting
back of significant interests). At first sight, this might be taken
to suggest that there are no moral responsibilities to assist at all,
thus moving from a view that may have seemed over-reaching,
to one that has no reach! The hiker, after all, is not planning to
harm the animals; the question is about assisting animals that
are already suffering.
But this is too simple: there are important human/animal
entanglements here. After all, humans bred these horses, and
bred them selectively, in ways that made them vulnerable to
the cold, with thinner, sleeker coats than wild horses. And they
were made yet more vulnerable once in existence by having
their coats kept short, and by being confined, so that it’s impossible for them to independently seek shelter or food elsewhere.
Although humans have not directly harmed these horses, then,
they have made them vulnerable. This vulnerability may not exactly have been intended, but it was at least easily foreseeable:
if animals are kept with short coats, confined without shelter,
not provided with sufficient food and water, and it’s the winter,
it’s obvious that they will be vulnerable to the cold. And, since
humans have put them in the position where they are now suffering, on this contextual view, there are special obligations to
assist. The reason why the horses should be assisted is not just
that they are suffering, but because humans are responsible for
making them vulnerable to that suffering.
However, the wild deer are in a different situation. Humans
haven’t selectively bred them, and they haven’t been confined
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or restrained. Their lives are, essentially, independent of ours.
So, there’s no special obligation on this basis to feed the hungry
deer, nor to protect hungry deer from a hungry coyote. On this
contextual view, then, in contrast to the capacity-oriented one
outlined earlier, while we should not intentionally harm wild
animals without good reason, if we haven’t caused their vulnerability, we don’t have any special obligation to assist them.
What happens to them is not our moral business.
It’s worth noting that this contextual view isn’t based on
the argument that we shouldn’t interfere with what’s “wild”
or “natural”, or with wild processes such as predation. Some
environmental ethicists do make such claims (in fact, in another context, Preston (2011) recently called non-interference
in nature the “presumptive argument” in environmental ethics).
Certainly, in some cases, this contextual view and wildnesspreserving accounts of environmental ethics will coincide in
practice. But on this contextual view, assisting wild animals
isn’t necessarily wrong; rather, it just isn’t normally required,
even if it would relieve suffering, because the kind of relationship that would generate such special obligations to assist
doesn’t normally exist between humans and wild animals. On
this view, obligations to assist only arise when there is some
kind of historical entanglement. (There might be a different
version of this view—that requirements to assist do exist in
such cases but that they are much weaker where there’s no prior
entanglement; however, I don’t have space to develop such a
view here.)
To say “doesn’t normally exist”, though, doesn’t mean that
there are no occasions where wild animals might be owed assistance. If humans prevent wild animals from living independent
lives, then special obligations to assist them may be acquired.
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So, captivity or habitat destruction might create such special
obligations. “Wild” and “domesticated”, then, are terms that
point to broader relations of independence versus human-created dependence and vulnerability. It’s these relations, rather than
being “wild” or “domesticated” in themselves, that matter here.
An implication of this contextual view is that—unlike on the
kind of consequentialist view I outlined earlier—there would
be no reason to aim to reduce the amount of suffering in nature
by managing or shaping nature differently, assuming we could
do so successfully. A contextual view alone wouldn’t forbid doing this (though there might be other good reasons not to do it)
but it’s not morally required, nor even morally desirable, on
this view, to make wild nature a less painful place.
This contextual approach, then, which takes into account relations as well as capacities, and does not aim to bring about
best consequences, may appear to have some advantages over
a capacity-oriented, consequentialist view. It reflects the widely held belief that special relations, (for instance, of created
dependence, as with our own children) create special obligations; and it offers a less all-encompassing vision of our ethical responsibilities than do standard forms of consequentialism
(though still, in the animal case, obligations significantly more
demanding than those we normally accept, since it’s rare, for
instance, for anyone to consider that anything at all is owed
to individual wild animals made vulnerable by human habitat
destruction).
However, this contextual approach has its own difficulties
that may lead us to think that this, more restricted view of what
we owe wild animals is nonetheless untenable. I’ll consider just
two of the many difficulties here.
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(a) This view draws on what Nozick (1974, 155) calls a “historical principle”, where past circumstances or actions can be a
direct justification for different entitlements. It looks back at the
ways in which people did (or did not) became entangled with
particular animals in order to work out what’s owed to them.
However, as with similar human cases, the history of entanglement may not be clear. And, even more significantly, there’s a
problem about who’s supposed to be responsible for assistance.
For instance, in the horse case I’ve raised: Suppose a farmer
has bred these horses, and then left them in the snowy field
without food, water or shelter. It’s plausible that the farmer has
special obligations to provide for the horses, obligations that
she’s failing to meet. But just because she has failed to do what
she should, does that mean that a passer-by inherits her responsibilities? Does this contextual view presuppose some idea of
collective responsibility—that I am responsible for what other
people do—or fail to do?
There are, I think, ways of resolving such questions about
who is responsible for assistance in cases like these (similar
issues arise in human cases, for instance in terms of reparations
claims; see Palmer (2010) for a more detailed discussion.) But
problems about who has moral responsibility for what do make
this contextual view complicated in practice. It may work better in policy-making contexts, where historical relations and
responsibilities can be more carefully considered, than on an
everyday basis where individuals are reacting and making decisions about particular situations on short timescales with incomplete information.
(b) A second factor makes this even more complicated:
fewer and fewer animals live completely independently of humans, even where their breeding is not controlled by people.
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Although the deer in this case have not been selectively bred,
human wildlife management has probably had some impact on
their existence or their lives. And anthropogenic climate change
is already affecting many wild animals’ habitats, raising questions about whether we should, in some cases, embark on programs of assisted migration. If anthropogenic phenomena such
as climate change create moral responsibilities to assist wild
animals, then the contextual view appears to become almost
as demanding as the consequentialist, capacity-oriented view.
I can only offer some very broad responses to this complication here. The first, most general point, I think, is that obligations to assist individual animals that result from broad
anthropogenic environmental impacts such as climate change
are likely to be weaker than those that result from practices
such as selective breeding. One reason for this is the nature of
the human practices involved. In at least some cases, animals
are deliberately and directly bred to be vulnerable—laboratory mice genetically modified to develop particular diseases,
for instance. In other cases, selectively breeding and confining
animals—as with the horses—makes them vulnerable in ways
that, as I’ve noted, can easily be foreseen, even if not exactly
intended. And in all modern domestication cases, at least, humans directly intend to create and shape animals’ bodies. The
impacts of climate change on wild animals are somewhat different: while it is increasingly obvious that there are and will
be effects on wild animals, these are effects of a practice not
aimed at animals at all; and in this sense it is less intentional
(and certainly less predictable) than the effects of domestication (though this argument will likely weaken over time)(see
Nolt 2011). Second, it’s currently difficult, and likely to remain
difficult, to identify exactly what ecological shifts actually can
be attributed to climate change. Third, as current research indi-
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cates, some animals will actually benefit from climate change,
so these animals, the beneficiaries, would not be owed any assistance. Fourth, in many cases it might not be possible to sustain assistance. If, for instance, an area is becoming significantly drier, the provision of (say) replacement artificial wetlands
habitat for animals, while in some sense responding to humancreated vulnerability, is likely to create more vulnerability over
time, given the degree of climate change to which we are now
committed. It may be better in these cases just to stand back,
and to allow animals better adapted to dry climatic conditions
to move into the area. And finally, any assistance should not
generate new obligations. So, for instance, assisted migration is
one way of helping certain animals made vulnerable by climate
change. But this practice raises the danger of creating vulnerability in new animal populations—those that have to compete
with new residents—as well as potentially producing stress and
distress to those animals moved to new habitats. So, climate
change raises very difficult issues: concerning the kind of intention involved, the benefits as well as costs it may bring to
wild animals, and because assistance may generate new vulnerabilities while at the same time relieving others. In cases of
this kind, a contextual view would seem to suggest at least very
careful consideration before acting to assist. But even if, for
these reasons, the special obligations to animals created by climate change may be less stringent than it at first appears, these
kinds of problems certainly do make this kind of contextual
view extremely complex.

6. Conclusion
I’ve outlined two different theoretical ideas of what we might
owe to wild animals, focusing on when (if ever) we should help
them. First, I considered a consequentialist, capacity-oriented
view, which by different routes maintains that we should aim to
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bring about greatest pleasure, net of pain and suffering, in the
world, including among wild animals. Some philosophical and
religious traditions regard this as the best way of viewing our
obligations towards animals, accepting the focus on animals’
capacities, not their relations to us, and the demanding ethical
position that this view implies. Then I considered a contextual
view, one maintaining that harming animals, whether wild or
not, without good reason is unethical; but that we’re only required to assist them if there’s some sense in which we are responsible for their vulnerability or suffering. This seems at first
sight less demanding, but raises questions about who is responsible for doing what, and appears to become more demanding
if we take anthropogenic phenomena such as climate change to
create obligations to assist.
Both these views seem unsatisfactory in various ways; in
particular, perhaps both commit us to too much with respect
to what we owe to wild animals. But what are the alternatives,
assuming that we take animal suffering seriously?
(a) One possibility is just to reject the idea that we have
obligations to assist any animals, including companion and agricultural animals, except where it benefits
people, even where humans are responsible for the
suffering or vulnerability. Since it usually does benefit
people to look after their companion or agricultural animals, this would get some of the way to protecting domesticated animals, but not many wild ones. However,
it leaves us with a lot of difficult cases, and provides us
with no moral grounds for judging the actions of those
who do abandon or neglect domesticated animals, if
they can claim that it’s not in their interests (as owners)
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to continue to provide for them. This is surely a problematic position.
(b) A second possibility is to identify a distinction between what’s owed to wild and domesticated animals
that’s not dependent, as is the contextual account, on
a ‘historical principle’ of how animal suffering or vulnerability came about—since this view will inevitably
generate assistance to some wild animals—but on some
other factor. However, I’m not sure what this account
might be, nor how it would have the ethical plausibility
that created dependence and vulnerability carries.
Neither of these possibilities obviously supplants the positions I’ve discussed in more detail in this paper. But certainly,
developments and refinements of the capacity-oriented consequentialist view and the contextual view I’ve discussed are
not only possible but also desirable. I’ve tried to give a balanced account of the merits and difficulties with both positions
(though obviously in somewhat simplified form). I expect that
much more complex and nuanced accounts of when and whether we should assist animals will shortly emerge in the growing
scholarship on animal ethics.
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